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DIFFERENCE: A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN RECENT SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CASE-LAW1
L du Plessis
 
 
*
1 Introductory observations 
 
 
 
The constitutional right to practice one's religion … is of fundamental 
importance in an open and democratic society. It is one of the 
hallmarks of a free society.2
There can be no doubt that the right to freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion in an open and democratic society contemplated by the 
Constitution is important. The right to believe or not to believe, and to 
act or not to act according to his or her beliefs or non-beliefs, is one 
of the key ingredients of any person's dignity.
 
 
3
These two dicta come from judgments of South Africa's Constitutional Court 
and confirmed, five years into the evolution of constitutional democracy in this 
country, that religious rights enjoy eminence among the rights entrenched in the 
 
 
                                            
* Lourens du Plessis. Department of Public Law, University of Stellenbosch. 
1 An adapted version of a paper presented at the First International Consortium for Law and 
Religion Studies (ICLARS) Conference "Law and religion in the 21st Century: Relations 
between States and Religious Communities" University of Milan, 22-24 January 2009. The 
paper was originally entitled State and Religion in South Africa: Problems, 
Perspectives and Recent Developments. 
2 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC) at par 25 per Ngcobo J. 
3 Christian Education SA v Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC); 2000 (4) SA 
757 (CC) at par 36 per Sachs J. The court continued to motivate this general proposition 
about the importance of religious and related rights as follows: "Yet freedom of religion 
goes beyond protecting the inviolability of the individual conscience. For many believers, 
their relationship with God or creation is central to all their activities. It concerns their 
capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves, their 
community and their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion provides support and 
nurture and a framework for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief has 
the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the 
cornerstone of human rights. It affects the believer's view of society and founds the 
distinction between right and wrong. It expresses itself in the affirmation and continuity of 
powerful traditions that frequently have an ancient character transcending historical 
epochs and national boundaries." 
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Bill of Rights in the Constitution.4 This is commensurate with the high value 
historically (and presently) ascribed to religious and related rights in free, open 
and democratic societies worldwide. The modest aim of the present 
contribution is not to try and give a full picture of South Africa's constitutional 
jurisprudence on these rights to date, or to identify similarities and differences 
with the position and with events elsewhere in the world.5 In the discussion that 
will follow the emphasis will be on jurisprudence of mainly the Constitutional 
Court, engendered by its adjudication of the (seemingly) eccentric claims of 
'religious Others' and culminating in the benchmark judgment in the case of 
KwaZulu Natal v Pillay6 (hereafter Pillay case). It will be shown that this 
judgment not only represents a high point in the adjudication of constitutional 
entitlements of religious (and cultural) Others, but also has the potential to 
contribute significantly to the growth of a jurisprudence sensitive to both the 
predicaments and legitimate constitutional entitlements of unconventional, 'non-
mainstream' claimants of religious rights and freedom. This jurisprudence, it will 
be argued, has the makings of a jurisprudence of difference taking its cue from 
what some political theorists have referred to as a politics of difference.7
2 Constitutional guarantees of religious and related rights 
 What 
this means will be explained in section 4 below. 
 
 
A bird's-eye view of constitutional provisions dealing directly with religious 
rights and freedoms is needed to be able to survey constitutional jurisprudence 
on the entitlements of religious Others. 
 
Section 15(1) is the Constitution's most salient freedom of religion clause 
guaranteeing everyone's "right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
                                            
4 Ch 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 
5 For full(-er) account cf eg Farlam "Freedom" 41-3. 
6 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). 
7 Young Justice. 
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belief and opinion". Equal in status and significance is section 9(1) 
guaranteeing everyone's equality before and equal protection and benefit of the 
law, read with section 9(3) explicitly proscribing unfair discrimination "against 
anyone" on the grounds of, amongst others, religion, conscience and belief. 
'Equality' in section 9(1) doubtlessly includes the equality and equal treatment 
of dissimilar religions and their adherents. 
 
Other provisions in the Bill of Rights qualify, amplify, contextualise and direct 
the basic section 15(1) and sections 9(1) and 9(3) entitlements to religious 
freedom and equality in various ways: 
 
2.1 Section 15(2) allows for the conduct of religious observances at state or 
state-aided institutions, provided that they take place on an equitable 
basis,8 rules made by appropriate public authorities are followed9 and 
attendance at them is free and voluntary.10
2.4 Section 31(1) of the Constitution augments the guarantee of religious 
freedom rights in section 15(1) and religious equality in sections 9(1) and 
9(3) with constitutionally entrenched backing to practice religion 
 
 
2.2 The right to establish and maintain, at own expense, independent 
educational institutions – including, for instance religiously and/or 
denominationally specific schools – is entrenched in section 29(3). Such 
institutions may not discriminate on the basis of race, must be registered 
with the state and must maintain standards not inferior to those at 
comparable public educational institutions.  
 
2.3 Section 15(3)(a) of the Constitution authorises legislation recognising 
marriages concluded under systems of religious personal or family law.  
 
                                            
8 S 15(2)(b). 
9 S 15(2)(a). 
10 S 15(2)(c). 
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communally, that is, as a "group activity or pursuit".11 Persons belonging 
to a religious (or cultural) community, it is stated, may not be denied the 
right to practice their religion (and enjoy their culture),12 and to form, join 
and maintain religious and cultural associations and other organs of civil 
society.13 Constitutional provision is furthermore made for a Commission 
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities to monitor the realisation of section 31 
entitlements.14
2.7  Section 7(1) of the Constitution characterises, with constitutional authority, 
the Bill of Rights, as a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa, 
enshrining the rights of all people in the country and affirming the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. Section 7(2) 
  
 
2.5 The Constitution requires the religious and related rights that it guarantees 
to be construed in context, permeated with the values which are 
articulated in, or implied by, amongst others, the founding provisions (in 
Chapter 1 (and especially sections 1 and 2) of the Constitution, section 7's 
characterisation – and statement of the main objectives – of the Bill of 
Rights, and the Preamble to the Constitution.  
 
2.6 Section 39(1) of the Constitution requires any interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights to promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and to consider 
international law. Foreign law may be considered. According to section 
39(2) legislation must be interpreted and the common and customary law 
developed in a manner that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights.  
 
                                            
11 Farlam (n 5) 41-3. Cf also Du Plessis 2002 NGTT 214-229. 
12 S 31(1)(a). 
13 S 31(1)(b). 
14 S 185 of the Constitution. 
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then enjoins the state to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of Rights". 
 
2.8  All rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights are limitable pursuant to 
stipulations of a general limitation clause (section 36) requiring limitations 
to be (only) in terms of law of general application; reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, and compliant with explicitly spelt out exigencies of 
proportionality.15
3 Adjudicating the constitutional entitlements of 'religious Others': 
the broad picture up to and including Pillay 
 Rights-specific limitations are, however, not thereby 
precluded and can be effected by constitutional provisions other than 
section 36 and even by the very provision guaranteeing the right in 
question. Religious and related rights can furthermore, in terms of section 
37(4) of the Constitution, be suspended during a duly declared state of 
emergency. 
 
 
3.1 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg16
Ms Solberg, an employee at a Seven Eleven chain store, was convicted of 
contravening section 90(1) of the Liquor Act
 
17 proscribing wine sales on 
Sunday. She challenged the constitutionality of the said provision contending 
that it infringed, amongst others, the right to freedom of religion18
                                            
15 When limiting a right the following factors must be taken into account so as to comply with 
proportionality (s 36(1)(a)-(e)): "(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose". 
16 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC). Hereafter the Solberg case. 
17 Act 27 of 1989. 
18 At the time entrenched in s 14(1) of the (transitional) Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993, the precursor to s 15(1) of the present Constitution. 
 of those 
citizens who, like herself, do not, on religious grounds, object to such sales. 
The Constitutional Court had a golden opportunity to hand down a benchmark 
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judgment on religious rights, but due to certain adverse circumstances this was 
not to be. First, the full record of the evidence before the court a quo was not 
before the Constitutional Court because the appellant did not follow the proper 
procedure bringing her case to the latter forum. Second, the Solberg case was 
not perceived as really dealing with religious freedom, but rather with 
commercial interests. Solberg, in the first place, challenged section 90(1) as an 
infringement of her right to participate freely in economic activity.19
Chaskalson P, speaking on behalf of the four, held that since Solberg's 
challenge was based on the freedom of religion clause in the transitional 
Constitution (section 14(1)), it required the court's consideration as a matter of 
religious free exercise only and not of religious equality and non-discrimination, 
as contemplated in sections 8(1) and (2) of that Constitution, too.
 The 
Constitutional Court unanimously held that there was no merit in this challenge. 
This left Solberg with a challenge based on the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion, a concern she had most certainly not seriously 
contemplated when she sold wine on a Sunday. 
 
Six justices of the court agreed that the said challenge could not be upheld, but 
were divided 4-2 on the reasons for this finding. Three justices thought that the 
challenge should be upheld, but agreed, on a significant issue of constitutional 
interpretation, with the deviate view of the minority of two judges in the group of 
six. (These three plus two judges will be referred to as 'the five', and the 
remaining judges dismissing the appeal as 'the four'.) 
 
20 Taking his 
cue from a dictum in the Canadian case of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd,21
                                            
19 A right at the time explicitly guaranteed in s 26 of the transitional Constitution but wholly 
absent from the 1996 Constitution. 
20 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) 
at par 99-102. 
 
Chaskalson P said the following about religious free exercise: 
21 (1985) 13 CRR 64 at 97. Chaskalson P elaborated as follows: "I cannot offer a better 
definition than this of the main attributes of freedom of religion. But as Dickson CJC went 
on to say freedom of religion means more than this. In particular he stressed that freedom 
implies an absence of coercion or constraint and that freedom of religion may be impaired 
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The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to 
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and 
practice or by teaching and dissemination. 
 
He understood freedom of religion as primarily an individual's right not to be 
coerced to do anything against her or his religious beliefs (or non-beliefs) – a 
right to be respected, in other words, and possibly protected, but hardly prone 
to promotion and fulfilment by the state.22
O'Regan J, articulating the concerns of the five, held that the guarantee of a 
right to freedom of religion at any rate entails entitlement to an even-handed 
treatment of religions and their adherents. In her view section 90(1) unjustifiably 
encroached on the right to religious freedom. Sachs J and Mokgoro J agreed 
that there was such an encroachment, but thought that it constituted a 
constitutionally justifiable limitation to the right in question, and therefore did not 
render section 90(1) unconstitutional.
 
 
23
O'Regan J disagreed with the four's contention that issues of religious equality 
were not up for consideration in Solberg, stating that the Constitution requires 
more from the legislature than that it refrain from coercion:
 
 
24
                                                                                                                               
by measures that force people to act or refrain from acting in a manner contrary to their 
religious beliefs. This is what the Lord's Day Act did; it compelled believers and non-
believers to observe the Christian Sabbath" (S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 
(10) BCLR 1348 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) at par 92).  
22 To use the terminology of s 7(2) of the Constitution. It must be added, in all fairness, that 
the transitional Constitution in terms of which the Seven Eleven Case was adjudicated, 
contained no provision akin to s 7. 
23 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) 
at par 165-179. 
24 Ibid at par 128. 
 
 
It requires in addition that the legislature refrain from favouring one 
religion over others. Fairness and even-handedness in relation to 
diverse religions is a necessary component of freedom of religion. 
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It may be mentioned in passing that the Solberg court was unanimous on one 
issue of considerable significance (though not immediately relevant to the 
present discussion), namely the absence, in the (transitional) Constitution, of an 
'establishment clause' erecting a wall of separation between church and state.25
3.2 Christian Education SA v Minister of Education
 
This has remained the position under the 1996 Constitution. 
 
26
An organisation of concerned Christian parents approached a High Court to 
strike down section 10 of the South African Schools Act,
  
27 which proscribes 
corporal punishment in any school, public or private/independent. According to 
the religious beliefs of the applicants, corporal punishment was a rudiment in 
the upbringing of their children. The High Court turned down the application and 
pointed out that the biblical authority on which the applicants relied suggested 
that only the parents of children (and not school officials in loco parentis) were 
entitled to administer corporal punishment.28 Expressing such a view brought 
the court riskily close to doctrinal entanglement.29
On appeal to the Constitutional Court
 
 
30 Sachs J handed down a carefully 
reasoned judgment dismissing the appeal on the basis that section 10 imposes 
a constitutionally acceptable limitation31
                                            
25 Ibid at par 99-102. 
26 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC); 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC). Hereafter the Christian Education 
case. 
27 Act 84 of 1996. 
28 Christian Education SA v Minister of Education of the Government of SA 1999 (9) BCLR 
951 (SE). 
29 Farlam (n 5) 41-40 - 41-41. 
30 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC); 2000 
(4) SA 757 (CC). 
31 In terms of s 36 of the Constitution. 
 on parents' free exercise of their 
religious beliefs. He refrained, however, from expressing any view on whether it 
is a constitutionally allowable exercise of a religious belief if parents themselves 
administer corporal punishment to their own children. He also did not really 
address the question what schools (and teachers) should at any rate be 
permitted to do in a country where a modern-day constitution, entrenching 
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fundamental rights in accordance with stringent standards of constitutional 
democracy, is in place. 
 
In a significant postscript to his judgment, Sachs J lamented the fact that there 
was no one before the court representing the interests of the children 
concerned.32
In spite of the fact that Christian Education had the effect of restraining the free 
exercise of a religious belief, it is a judgment in which the significance of 
religious and related rights is stated most unequivocally – as appears from the 
tenor of the second of the two dicta cited at the beginning of this article.
 He thought that the children, many of them in their late teens and 
coming from a highly conscientised community, would have been capable of 
articulate expression: 
 
Although both the state and the parents were in a position to speak 
on their behalf, neither was able to speak in their name. 
 
It would therefore have been advisable, he opined, to have appointed a curator 
ad litem to represent the interests of the children whose contribution would 
have "enriched the dialogue". 
 
33
3.3 The Prince Saga
 
 
34
Gareth Prince, a consumer of cannabis sativa (or 'dagga') for spiritual, 
medicinal, culinary and ceremonial purposes as an integral part of practising his 
religion as Rastafarian, successfully completed his legal studies to a point 
where, qualification-wise, he became eligible to be registered as a candidate 
 
                                            
32 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC); 2000 
(4) SA 757 (CC) at par 53. 
33 Cf n 1 supra. 
34 Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C); Prince 
v President, Cape Law Society 2000 (7) BCLR 823 (SCA); 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA); Prince 
v President, Cape Law Society 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC) (hereinafter the interim Prince 
judgment); Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC); 2002 (2) SA 
794 (CC) (hereinafter the final Prince judgment, and generally referred to as the Prince 
case). 
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attorney doing community service. He had twice been convicted of the statutory 
offence of possessing dagga, however, and this raised doubts about his fitness 
and propriety to be so registered, especially in the light of his declared intention 
to continue using dagga for religious purposes. The Law Society of the Cape of 
Good Hope refused him registration whereupon he unsuccessfully challenged 
the society's decision in the Cape High Court.35
Prince appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
 
 
36 His appeal was dismissed 
and he then lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. A divided court 
eventually dismissed the appeal with a 5-4 majority,37 but before doing so 
handed down a significant interim judgment38
                                            
35 Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C). 
36 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2000 (7) BCLR 823 (SCA); 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA). 
37 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC); 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC). 
38 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC). 
 in the course of which Ngcobo J 
intimated that neither the applicant nor the respondents had - in the course of 
the litigious proceedings commencing in the Cape High Court – adduced 
sufficient evidence for any court finally to decide the crucial controversies 
involved in the case. From Prince the court needed more evidence as to 
precisely how and in which circumstances Rastafarians use dagga as part of 
their religious observances. From the respondents the court needed evidence 
elucidating the practical difficulties that may be encountered should 
Rastafarians be allowed to acquire, possess and use dagga strictly for religious 
purposes. The case was postponed in order to give both sides the opportunity 
to gather and adduce the required evidence. This was quite an extraordinary 
procedural concession in a final court of appeal, since parties are normally 
required to adduce all relevant evidence at the time when an action is brought 
in the court of first instance. Only in rare circumstances are litigants allowed to 
adduce additional evidence on appeal. The Constitutional Court, however, 
thought that such circumstances indeed existed in the Prince case. Ngcobo J 
explained: 
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[T]he appellant belongs to a minority group. The constitutional right 
asserted by the appellant goes beyond his own interest — it affects 
the Rastafari community. The Rastafari community is not a powerful 
one. It is a vulnerable group. It deserves the protection of the law 
precisely because it is a vulnerable minority. The very fact that 
Rastafari use cannabis exposes them to social stigmatisation…Our 
Constitution recognises that minority groups may hold their own 
religious views and enjoins us to tolerate and protect such views. 
However, the right to freedom of religion is not absolute. While 
members of a religious community may not determine for 
themselves which laws they will obey and which they will not, the 
state should, where it is reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting 
the believers to a choice between their faith and respect for the 
law.39
The Constitutional Court thus made an attempt to accommodate concerns of a 
vulnerable, religious minority, but did not fully deliver on the promise that its 
effort held, for its final (majority) judgment went against Prince.
 
 
40
3.4 MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay
 The ratio 
underlying the majority of the court's final decision is that it is impossible for 
state agencies involved in enforcing the overall statutory prohibition on the use 
of dagga, to make allowance for the use of small quantities of this prohibited 
substance for religious purposes without actually compromising the justifiable 
objectives of the overall prohibition. The minority of the court did not dispute the 
legitimacy of criminalising the possession and use of dagga in general, but 
argued that it was feasible for the state agencies involved to lay down and 
police conditions for Rastafarians' limited use of dagga for religious purposes. 
 
41
As one of South Africa's 2,49% Indians and 1,2% Hindus, Sunali Pillay, a 
female teenager at the time when events resulting in the litigation with her 
school were brought to a head, is (and was at the time) a likely candidate for 
religious and cultural 'Othering' – if not marginalisation. However, as a learner 
at Durban Girls' High School, one of the best schools in the country, she also 
 
                                            
39 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2000 (7) BCLR 823 (SCA); 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA); 
Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC) at par 26. 
40 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC); 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC). 
41 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) (the Pillay case). 
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belongs to the exquisite minority of South African learners particularly privileged 
to have enjoyed an excellent secondary school education. The school is a 
former 'Model C school' – the code name, as South Africans know, for 
advantaged, previously all white state schools, by far better resourced and 
staffed than their previously (and mostly still) all black, all coloured and all 
Indian/Asian counterparts in de facto uniracial residential areas. Model C 
schools have increasingly taken in learners (and to a lesser extent teachers) 
from race groups other than whites, and some of these schools have achieved 
quite a high participation rate of learners from diverse ethnic origins and cultural 
backgrounds.42
                                            
42 In this regard the Durban Girls' High School – in the course of the judgment in MEC for 
Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 125 – got an 
excellent report card from no less an authority than the Chief Justice of the Republic of 
South Africa himself:  "Durban Girls' High School, the school at issue in this case, is one 
of the exceptions. Although historically it was a school for White girls under apartheid law, 
that has changed dramatically in the last fifteen years. Now, we were told from the bar, of 
its approximately 1300 learners, approximately 350 are Black, 350 are Indian, 470 are 
White and 90 are Coloured. Moreover, it is an educationally excellent school which 
produces fine matriculation results. It is at the cutting edge of non-racial education, facing 
the challenges of moving away from its racial past to a non-racial future where young girls, 
regardless of their colour or background, can be educated. This context is crucial to how 
we approach this case". 
 
 
At a school as first-rate as – but with school fees considerably lower than – any 
prestigious private school, noblesse (still) obliges, and Sunali's school 
accordingly prides itself on an exemplary Code of Conduct, duly adopted by the 
governing body in consultation with learners, parents and educators. A 
learner's parents must sign an undertaking to ensure that their child will comply 
with the Code, in terms of which wearing a school uniform to school is non-
negotiable. The only jewellery allowed with the school uniform is "[e]ar-rings, 
plain round studs/sleepers . . . ONE in each ear lobe at the same level" and 
wrist watches in keeping with the uniform. Especially excluded is "any 
adornment/bristle which may be in any body piercing". Strict enforcement of 
these "jewellery rules" sparked the Pillays' dispute with the school. 
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Upon reaching physical maturity, and as a form of religious and cultural 
expression, Sunali had her nose pierced and a gold stud inserted. The school 
did not take kindly to this contravention of its jewellery stipulations, but gave 
Sunali permission to wear the stud until the piercing had healed, and then 
remove it or else face disciplinary proceedings in terms of the Code. 
Navaneethum Pillay, Sunali's mother, was requested to write a letter to the 
school explaining why, as a form of religious and cultural expression, Sunali 
had to wear a nose stud. 
 
In her letter to the school Mrs Pillay explained that they came from a South 
Indian family and that they intended to maintain their cultural identity by 
upholding the traditions of the women before them. Insertion of the nose stud is 
part of a time-honoured family tradition. When a young woman reaches 
physical maturity her nose is pierced and a stud inserted indicating that she had 
become eligible for marriage. The practice is meant to honour daughters as 
responsible young adults. Sunali, Mrs Pillay claimed, wore the nose stud not for 
fashion purposes, but as part of a religious ritual and a long-standing family 
tradition, and therefore for cultural reasons too.43
Langa CJ, writing for the majority of the court,
 
 
The school management refused to grant Sunali an exemption to wear the 
nose stud. Mrs Pillay, complaining of discrimination, took the case to an 
equality court, which found in favour of the school. The Pillays successfully 
appealed to the Durban High Court, whereafter the school appealed to the 
Constitutional Court which handed down the judgment presently under 
discussion, dismissing the school's appeal. 
 
44
                                            
43 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 8. 
 found that the provisions of the 
school's Code of Conduct combined with the governing board's refusal to grant 
44 The minority judgment of O'Regan J is wholly in agreement with the results of the majority 
judgment, but poses relevant questions about possible alternative routes to the same 
destination and she draws a sharper distinction between religion and culture and the 
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Sunali an exemption, resulted in discrimination against her. The problem with 
the Code was that it did not provide for any procedure to obtain exemption from 
the jewellery stipulations and excluded nose studs from its list of jewellery that 
may be worn with the school uniform. The Code thus compromised the sincere 
religious and cultural beliefs or practices of a learner like Sunali, but not those 
of other learners. This latter group constituted a comparator showing up the 
discrimination against Sunali and others in a similar position. The court 
emphasised that –  
 
the norm embodied by the Code is not neutral, but enforces 
mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment, such as 
ear studs which also involve the piercing of a body part, at the 
expense of minority and historically excluded forms. Accordingly a 
burden is placed on learners who are unable to express themselves 
fully and must attend school in an environment that did not 
completely accept them.45
The court further pointed out that it did not really make a difference whether the 
discrimination was on religious or cultural grounds, especially since Sunali was 
part of a group defined by a combination of religion, language, geographical 
origin, ethnicity and artistic tradition.
 
 
 
46
                                                                                                                               
constitutional rights pertaining to them than Langa CJ does – cf n 4 infra. Cf MEC for 
Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 143-146. 
For present purposes, however, this debate is not of pressing importance. 
45 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 44. 
See also Young (n 7) 168: "Integration into the full life of the society should not have to 
imply assimilation to dominant norms and abandonment of group affiliation and culture. If 
the only alternative to the exclusion of some groups defined as Other by dominant 
ideologies is the assertion that they are the same as everybody else, then they will 
continue to be excluded because they are not the same." 
46 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 50. 
 At the same time, however, religion and 
culture as grounds on which discrimination can take place should not be 
collapsed, because –  
 
religion is ordinarily concerned with personal faith and belief, while 
culture generally relates to traditions and beliefs developed by a 
community.  
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The two can nonetheless overlap, so that –  
 
while it is possible for a belief or practice to be purely religious or 
purely cultural, it is equally possible for it to be both religious and 
cultural.47
Freedom is one of the underlying values of our Bill of Rights and 
courts must interpret all rights to promote the underlying values of 
'human dignity, equality and freedom'. These values are not mutually 
exclusive but enhance and reinforce each other … . A necessary 
element of freedom and of dignity of any individual is an 'entitlement 
to respect for the unique set of ends that the individual pursues.' One 
of those ends is the voluntary religious and cultural practices in 
which we participate. That we choose voluntarily rather than through 
a feeling of obligation only enhances the significance of a practice to 
our autonomy, our identity and our dignity.
 
 
Sunali sincerely believed that wearing a nose stud was part of her religion and 
culture, but the evidence in the case showed that it was no mandatory tenet of 
either her religion or her culture. The court, however, thought that this in no way 
lessened the school's discrimination against her: 
 
48
The State, an employer or a school, must take positive measures 
and possibly incur additional hardship or expense in order to allow all 
people to participate and enjoy all their rights equally. It ensures that 
we do not relegate people to the margins of society because they do 
not or cannot conform to certain social norms.
 
 
In considering whether the discrimination against Sunali was unfair, the court 
(also) explored the notion of "reasonable accommodation" concluding that its 
absence in casu rendered the discrimination against Sunali unfair: 
 
49
But then, of course, there is always the "slippery slope" scenario or, worse, the 
"parade of horribles" which may, in other cases, turn the tiny gold nose stud 
 
 
                                            
47 Ibid at par 47. 
48 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 63-
64. 
49 Ibid at par 73. 
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"[a]t the centre of the storm"50
Firstly, this judgment applies only to bona fide religious and cultural 
practices. It says little about other forms of expression. The 
possibility for abuse should not affect the rights of those who hold 
sincere beliefs. Secondly, if there are other learners who hitherto 
were afraid to express their religions or cultures and who will now be 
encouraged to do so, that is something to be celebrated, not feared. 
As a general rule, the more learners feel free to express their 
religions and cultures in school, the closer we will come to the 
society envisaged in the Constitution. The display of religion and 
culture in public is not a "parade of horribles" but a pageant of 
diversity which will enrich our schools and in turn our country.
 in the Pillay case, into an ornament as 
conspicuous as a nose ring – or a headscarf or a facial veil – or as dangerous 
as a kirpan, the metal dagger of religious and cultural significance worn by Sikh 
men. The court dismissed both this line of argument and the fears inducing it:  
 
51
In an earlier case
 
 
This dictum neatly captures how the Pillay case is about constitutional 
substantiation for the affirmation and celebration of identity, also and especially 
the identity of the Other, for this is what really liberates the self from fear for the 
unknown. 
 
52
                                            
50 In the words of Langa CJ MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 
(1) SA 474 (CC) at par 1. 
51 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 
107. 
52 Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School 2002 (4) SA 738 (C). 
 the Cape High Court adjudicated the issue of wearing 
Rastafarian dreadlocks and a cap to school, allegedly in contravention of the 
school's Code of Conduct, very sympathetically – even generously – in favour 
of a learner claiming her right freely to express her religious beliefs. In this case 
the school's Code of Conduct was enforced by its governing body in quite a 
draconian way. The Code graphically depicted a number of forbidden hair 
styles, but did not say anything about dreadlocks (and caps) and yet the 
governing body expelled the applicant from the school for wearing dreadlocks 
and a cap, after finding her guilty of serious misconduct. This meant that she 
was treated as if she had committed a criminal offence! 
L DU PLESSIS  PER 2009(12)4 
26/360 
 
 
 
4 Assessment and analysis – with Pillay as benchmark 
Pillay, I venture to suggest, was inspired by what may appropriately be referred 
to as a jurisprudence of difference. By analogy with a "politics of difference"53 
such jurisprudence affirms and, indeed, celebrates the Other beyond the 
confines of mere tolerance or even magnanimous recognition and acceptance. 
The court in Pillay in effect insisted on compliance with the injunction in section 
7(2) of the Constitution that the state must respect, protect and, on top of that, 
promote and fulfil the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.54 As Iris Marion 
Young suggests, a politics (and jurisprudence) of difference have a distinctive 
grasp of "quality equality":55
A goal of social justice . . . is social equality. Equality refers not 
primarily to the distribution of social goods, though distributions are 
certainly entailed by social equality. It refers primarily to the full 
participation and inclusion of everyone in a society's major 
institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all 
to develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices.
 
 
56
For Sunali Pillay, distribution had determined access to a "privileged school 
context", but full participation and unconstrained inclusion finally had to 
determine the meaningfulness of her "presence" as beneficiary-Other in that 
context. The achievement of such quality participation, calls for memory of a 
history of denied participation and decided exclusion of the Other, as the 
 
 
                                            
53 Young (n 7). 
54 In the judgement itself only passing reference is made to s 7(2) and then not in a context 
where any of the main issues in the case is dealt with; cf MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 
2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 40 n 18. 
55 Young (n 7) 173. 
56 That a politics (or jurisprudence) of difference is not unproblematic without ado and may 
result in an (unwanted) 'over-inclusion' of the Other not duly honouring her/his difference 
or 'otherness' is, as Lindahl "Recognition" convincingly argues, a possibility that (also) 
ought to be reckoned with – but this, I would suggest, was not the outcome in Pillay. 
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following dictum from Langa CJ's judgment in Pillay, dealing with the protection 
of voluntary (as opposed to obligatory) religious practices,57
The protection of voluntary as well as obligatory practices also 
conforms to the Constitution's commitment to affirming diversity. It is 
a commitment that is totally in accord with this nation's decisive 
break from its history of intolerance and exclusion. Differentiating 
between mandatory and voluntary practices does not celebrate or 
affirm diversity, it simply permits it. That falls short of our 
constitutional project which not only affirms diversity, but promotes 
and celebrates it. We cannot celebrate diversity by permitting it only 
when no other option remains.
 so aptly explains: 
 
58
The Pillay judgment is not perfect in every way and some of the conceptual and 
strategic choices the court made are debatable. O'Regan J who, in her minority 
judgment, is in agreement with the results of the majority judgment, posed 
questions about alternative routes to the destination where the majority arrived 
and, for instance, drew a sharper distinction between religion and culture and 
the constitutional rights pertaining to them than Langa CJ in the majority 
judgment did.
 
 
59
For present purposes, however, we are mostly interested in Pillay as (to use a 
Dworkinian metaphor)
 
60
In Solberg a traditionally disadvantaged religious Other was absent. Actually 
the claimant was very much an entrepreneurial wolf(-ess) in religious sheep's 
clothes, claiming protection of a religious right for non-religious reasons. This 
certainly inhibited the development of what might have grown into a 
 a chapter in a constitutional chain novel interrogating 
issues of identity and difference. It then becomes worthwhile to look at the 
previously discussed pre-Pillay cases once again – with the wisdom of 
hindsight. 
 
                                            
57 And elaborating on two previously cited dicta in MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) 
BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 63-64. 
58 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 65. 
59 Ibid at par 143-146. 
60 Dworkin Law's Empire 228-238. 
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jurisprudence of difference, centred on religious and related rights, rendering 
Solberg a bad case making bad law in this respect as well. 
 
A comparison of the adjudicative strategies in Solberg and Pillay, tangibly 
influenced by the litigious route for which the dominus litis in each case opted, 
gives pause about reliance on equality in addition to (or perhaps even instead 
of) freedom, in litigation on the realisation of religious and related entitlements. 
It will be remembered that in Solberg four of the nine judges thought that if a 
constitutional complainant in her or his pleadings contends that a law is 
unconstitutional because it infringes the right to freedom of religion, it is not 
competent for the court to test the constitutionality of the impugned legislation 
with reference to religious equality claims too. Five of the judges, however, 
thought that the court in casu could entertain questions relating to the even-
handed (and therefore equal) treatment of people of different religious 
convictions and affiliations under the impugned legislation, and this was, for 
stare decisis purposes, the majority position in the case. The latter approach is 
to be preferred, first, because it makes for a systematic (that is: coherent) 
reading of the constitutional provisions entrenching religious freedom61 and 
equality62 respectively, in the context of the Bill of Rights and of the Constitution 
as a whole, and, second, because it duly accounts for the effect of equality as a 
constitutional value63
Reliance on equality in Pillay resulted in a much more potent and far-reaching 
affirmation of the religious and related rights of the claimant than was the case 
in Solberg where legislation was constitutionally challenged. Pillay was brought 
– and decided by three courts (of which two were specialist equality courts) – 
as an equality complaint. Why then could it end up as such a powerful assertion 
 (co-)determining the meaning of (the right to) religious 
freedom. 
 
                                            
61 S 14(1) of the transitional and s 15(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
62 S 8(2) of the transitional and s 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution. 
63 S 33(1)(a)(ii) and 35(1) of the transitional and s 1(a), 7(1), 36(1) and 39(1)(a) of the 1996 
Constitution. 
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of the claimant's religious and cultural rights (and identity, one could add)? A 
comparator, called for when dealing with an equality complaint, facilitates the 
detection of decided difference or otherness and of disparities conventionally 
(and perhaps even unknowingly) involved in dealing with the matter complained 
of. This 'discovery', in its turn, shows up inarticulate preferences and biases 
underlying supposedly neutral norms, and interrogates the even-handedness of 
the effects of such norms. All these considerations were but marginally present 
in Solberg, but prominent in Pillay. However, invoked as listed grounds for the 
prohibition of discrimination, 'religion' and 'culture' were not treated with 
exemplary definitional precision in Pillay. 
 
In Christian Education, which focused on freedom of religion as the substance 
of a constitutional right, conceptual accuracy was more the order of the day and 
the judgment handed down by Sachs J has indeed become a landmark for 
definitional orientation in dealing with key concepts in the discourse on religious 
and related rights in the South African context. Christian Education is to a large 
extent the milestone that Solberg could have been. The claimants in this case 
were not really 'religious Others', but were part of a mainstream Christianity 
privileged enough to sustain a system of independent schools. The 
Constitutional Court showed much genuine understanding for the religious 
entitlements of these claimants, affording them the consideration of articulate 
conceptual analysis, but also demarcating them and duly restraining their 
exercise. 
The rather salient "jurisprudence of difference" moment in Christian Education 
was Sachs J's obiter suggestion that the learners involved themselves should 
have had the opportunity to express their views in court. This judicial 
afterthought challenged a deep-seated belief (and prejudice), namely that in 
really weighty matters concerning their upbringing and education, children 
should be seen and not heard. 
 
The Constitutional Court's insistence, in the interim Prince judgment, that 
Prince and the Rastafarian community, had to be afforded the fullest possible 
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opportunity to be heard – precisely because they are 'religious Others' – 
signalled an attempt to ensure their quality participation and inclusion in public 
life. It could not prevent the eventual 'othering' of Prince as outcome of the 
saga, though. The court, in its final judgment, paid serious attention to the 
question what the possible effects would be of allowing, as religious 
observance, conduct conventionally regarded as a threat to the good order in 
society. (Actually the court in Pillay had to deal with a similar question in 
relation to a more limited community, namely a school.) By a narrow majority 
the court in Prince finally concluded that it could not hand down a judgment 
licensing unlawful conduct – but in the process the court also failed to address 
Prince's actual concern, namely his fitness and propriety, as consumer of 
cannabis, to practice as an attorney. Especially this oversight ended in a non-
fulfilment of the consideration that the Constitutional Court so encouragingly 
afforded Prince (and his eccentric community of Others) in the interim 
judgment. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
The Constitutional Court's jurisprudence in relation to issues of identity and 
difference has increasingly been interrogating, with transformative rigour, 
'mainstream' preferences and prejudices regarding the organisation of societal 
life, inspired by a desire to proceed beyond – and 'not again' to resurrect – all 
that used to contribute to and sustain marginalisation of the Other. In this article 
I showed how this has happened in cases dealing with the right to freedom of 
religion (and related rights). 
 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister 
of Home Affairs64
                                            
64 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). 
 (Fourie case), the Constitutional Court judgment in which the 
statutory and common-law exclusions of same-sex life partnerships from the 
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ambit of 'marriage' were held to be unconstitutional, is another example of 
recent Constitutional Court case law qua jurisprudence of difference, in which 
considerations of religious belief operated in the background, but were 
significantly present nonetheless.65
[t]he hallmark of an open and democratic society is its capacity to 
accommodate and manage difference of intensely-held world views 
and life styles in a reasonable and fair manner.
 Commenting on religious objections to gay 
marriages, the court expressed the view that –  
 
66
There are important challenges involved in negotiating the shoals between the 
Scylla of strongly held religious beliefs and the Charybdis of affirming and 
celebrating an otherness whose marginalisation has been justified – and may 
even have been called for – by those very beliefs. In a constitutional democracy 
this dilemma must be confronted head-on – wary to avoid doctrinal 
entanglement – which is a challenge in itself.
 
 
67 The issue of doctrinal 
entanglement came prominently to the fore in the Transvaal Provincial Division 
of the Equality Court in the case of Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde 
Gemeente Moreleta Park68
                                            
65 Reflecting on an appropriate response to gay and lesbian Others, Sachs J observed that: 
"[t]he acknowledgment and acceptance of difference is particularly important in our country 
where for centuries group membership based on supposed biological characteristics such 
as skin colour has been the express basis of advantage and disadvantage. South Africans 
come in all shapes and sizes. The development of an active rather than a purely formal 
sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people 
with all their differences, as they are. The Constitution thus acknowledges the variability of 
human beings (genetic and socio-cultural), affirms the right to be different, and celebrates 
the diversity of the nation" (Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at par 
60). 
66 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at par 95. 
67 Farlam (n 5) 41-40 - 41-41. 
68 [2008] ZAGPHC 269; 2009 (4) SA 510 (T). 
 (Strydom case) where the court was called upon to 
decide whether it was permissible for a congregation to terminate the services 
of the head of its "art academy" who openly entered into a gay relationship. The 
complainant instituted proceedings on the basis that he was discriminated 
against unfairly, while the congregation maintained that it was acting in terms of 
its religious beliefs and therefore exercised its religious freedom as sustained 
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by the Constitution. The court found in favour of the complainant. The question 
is: was it justified to give a judgment effectively rejecting the church's case 
based on its "doctrinal beliefs" about homosexuality? 
 
In the wake of cases such as Fourie and Pillay (and Strydom) rigorous debate 
has been taking place on public platforms about taboos formerly relegated to 
(and hidden away in) "the private sphere". The bold assertions of the 
Constitutional Court on the affirmation and celebration of the Other, challenge 
all religions with simultaneously lofty and magnanimous ideas about "doing 
unto Others" to make themselves heard as well, for "our Constitution does not 
tolerate diversity as a necessary evil, but affirms it as one of the primary 
treasures of our nation"69 and "neither the Equality Act70 nor the Constitution 
require (sic!) identical treatment. They require equal concern and equal 
respect".71
                                            
69 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 92. 
70 That is, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
71 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 
103. 
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